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SUMMARY
Respondents Chevron and Salt Lake County have filed briefs in
reply to Appellant Sandy City.

The theme of both briefs is that

the Utah statutes, County ordinances, and rules of procedure and
evidence, which form the basis of this appeal, do not apply to
them.

They hope, through such posture, to acquire the narrowest

possible review.
Respondent's arguments are not valid.

Nevertheless, it is

possible that these allegations may cause confusion or distraction
from the real issues before the Court.

For this reason, the City

has prepared this reply.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A

statement

of

the

previously been provided.

facts

relevant

to

this

appeal

Those facts remain unrefuted.

has

However,

Chevron has noted that some facts were not referenced to the
record.

A supplemental reference is included as Appendix "A" to

this reply. With that accomplished, each factual allegation by the
City is unrefuted and has been directly referenced to the record.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
CHEVRON AND SALT LAKE COUNTY MISCONSTRUE THE STATE
STATUTE
WHICH
RESTRICTS
UNINCORPORATED
"URBAN
DEVELOPMENT." SUCH CONSTRUCTION SHOULD BE REJECTED BY
THE COURT
A.
THE PRINCIPLE MEANS BY WHICH CHEVRON AND THE COUNTY
MISCONSTRUE THE URBAN DEVELOPMENT STATUTE IS THROUGH FICTION.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY RELIED UPON THESE
FICTIONS, WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN DISPELLED HAD DISCOVERY AND TRIAL
PROCESSES BEEN PERMITTED TO PROCEED.
1

The Chevron and County briefs contain a common distracting
dimension -- the repeated reliance upon fiction.

The resort to

fiction does not just color the briefs -- it is their central
element upon which all their arguments rest.
The fictions posed by these parties are of two principle
types:

those

which

construe

characterize processes.

specific

facts

and

those

which

The following are examples of fictions

which have been suggested as factual:
Fiction No. 1 - That Only the Chevron Phase of Development is
the Subject of this Action.

Respondents claim that "Sandy had

undertaken no suit against McDonalds" at the time summary judgment
was granted.

Their inference is that a McDonalds Restaurant --

the second phase of the development - - i s outside the scope of this
appeal.
The 4.18 acre development consists of multiple phases.

They

include the following:
Phase
Chevron
McDonalds
Other Phases
Totals

Percent of Total
Development

Acres
.70
1.30
2.18
4.18

17%
31%
52%
100%

All of the foregoing property, which constitutes the Chevron,
McDonalds and subsequent development phases, is described as part
of the development in the City's Verified Complaint.

Chevron brief, p. 19
2

R4
2

Besides

Chevron

and

McDonalds,

a bank,

medical

office

building,

and

additional commercial development have been planned.
The District Court never considered the full scope of the
development.

Its Memorandum Decision evidences its belief that

Chevron and McDonalds were the only development phases.

In fact,

they were less than one-half of the full project.
McDonalds was not named in this action because it was not a
property owner.

Yeates, Priest, Kjar, and Smoot were the property

owners of the entire development at the time summary judgment
motions were heard.

They are, accordingly, named in this action.

The City has kept McDonalds informed of this action in the
District Court.

McDonalds has not chosen to intervene or to

contest the City's factual allegations in this action.

McDonalds'

absence is by its own choice -- it does not diminish the scope of
development here under review.
Fiction No. 2 - That "Sandy's own evidence" shows the Costs
of the Chevron Phase to be Less than $750,000. The County contends
that all evidence consistently shows the Chevron phase to be less
than $750,000 in total costs.

That assertion is wrong.

Administrative evidence, envelope 6 #21.
plan appears as Exhibit "B" to this brief.
4

The MAI

A copy of this

R261, para, (d).

Counsel for McDonalds is Fabian & Clendenin.
certificates at R154, 172, 284

See mailing

After hearing on summary judgment in this action, McDonalds
acquired ownership to a portion of the development property. An
action was then initiated against McDonalds (Case No. C88-03898).
No determination has yet been made in that action.
3

appraisal submitted by the City estimated costs of that phase at
$660,000 to $760,000.

This range assumes the land "value" to be

•7

$210,000.

However, according to Chevron officials, the actual
o

"costs" of the land were apparently much higher.
Even without the admission by Chevron officials, there is at
least a factual issue whether first phase exceeds the $750,000
urban development restriction.
Fiction No. 3 - That to Enforce the Urban Development Statute
Would be Impossible for the County. Respondents contend that it
would have been impossible for the County to have projected costs
for the entire development in determining whether the $750,000
urban development restriction should apply.

They allege that the

County has no authority to consider the development as a whole and
Q

no way to estimate prospective development costs.

This contention

is misleading in two obvious respects.
First, the Urban Development Statute

(10-2-418) expressly

obligates the County to estimate costs for "all phases" of the
development.

7

Utah

Code

Section

57-5-3

contains

R133-135 (Appraisal, Appendix "A," p. 23)
R108 (Testimony of Sam Jones).

o

County brief, p. 19.

additional

authority -- and perhaps obligations -- for planning commission
review of this entire development prior to its subdivision.
Second, it is practical for the County to estimate the cost
of a development prior to actual construction.

This is especially

true in this case, since the scope of the Development was planned
and known prior to commercial zoning.
County staff had no problem in concluding that the development
lP

would exceed $750,000.

Sandy City was also able to estimate full

development costs -- certified by an MAI appraiser.
County maintains, by

statute, one of the

appraisal staffs in the state.

Salt

largest real

Lake
estate

The County has the capacity to

estimate the cost or value of any property within its boundaries
and the authority to require sworn statements by property owners
as to such value.
It is ludicrous for the County to assert that, under such
circumstances, it could not have estimated whether this development
would exceed $750,000.

The problem here is not that the County

Emphasis added. Salt Lake County contends that Section
17-27-27 renders this section ineffective by defining "subdivision"
to exclude "commercial" development.
However, that definition
expressly only applies to Title 17. Section 17-27-22 requires
that more stringent regulations under other statutes govern.
Envelope 6 #21 and envelope 4 #4 (Appraisal, p.5).
*?

1

Rill (Testimony of County Development Services Director).
13

Utah Code Ann. 59-2-301, et seq.

1C

* Utah Code Ann. 59-2-306.

5

lacked the resources to meet its statutory obligations -- but that
it did not even try.
Fiction No. 4 - That Salt Lake County is Not Required to
Comply with the Filing Requirements of the Rules of Civil Procedure
as are Other
hearing,

Salt

Parties. Partially
Lake

County

through

presented

the

Summary

affidavits

voluminous administrative record to the Court.

Judgment

certifying

a

The evidence was

received by the Court over repeated City objections

and was

relied upon in granting summary judgment to respondents.
The County acknowledges that these affidavits were not filed
ten days before hearing as required by Rules 6(d) and 56(c) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

But it contends that these rules

apply only to "affidavits" and not to "certifications." The County
also argues that "public records" are exempt from timeliness rules
because the public can review them at any time.
The

County's

distinction

between

"affidavits"

and

"certifications" is a fiction without substance and is irrelevant.
The County records were in fact certified by "affidavit."

Even

legal counsel for the county characterized their "certifications"
17

as "affidavits" before the District Court.
The County argument for a "public record" exception to the
rules of procedure is also a fiction.

15

T21-30, 74-75.
County brief, p. 15.

17

T21
6

The rules do not permit such

exc??

A p-"rvy opposing* so>'^ motion needs

nc*;.f^ ot win'-h e\ .deno,- a

mo*•!:"•: r ~' ' y is relying on in order to prepare present coun ter
evidence

and argument.

When the County
heari i lg,
City

'

;

submitted

without

'- - stackr

stipulation

-^

•

-f ^ v j r e n t ?
>i

" " The County posed no reason why :

^ , " -^tv-^

3t the
«

the
< -t-td

'.'...;.

its massive evidence ::n^iv u i Ui : tr notion.
^r,-< hr«-\ M:~ conclusion"
Memorani.1..:: Decision

//itho'^

•

i-rLyin. o: ~ ne document;- v....

.ts
"i::e

]9

r.r-iPt-y suhir-t'ted in viola1. :••:.

'

• iies.

Si immary judgment

B.
CHEVRON AND THE COUNTY MISCONSTRUE THE "URBAN DEVELOPMENT"
STATUTE BY A SECOND MEANS -- THROUGH SEGMENTATION -- ITSELF A TYPE
OF FICTION.
THIS DEVICE ARTIFICIALLY CAUSES THE CHEVRON PROJECT
TO BE CONSTRUED IN THE ABSENCE OF ITS COMPLETE DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT.
THIS DEVICE MISLED THE DISTRICT COURT AND SHOULD BE REJECTED ON
APPEAL.
i <-• j f

j

construction
a re>vn:r

-

.• ..

i::

*

j

he

v i r i 'f * i !. y ^11 ejements ^r tiiis aft ion o'.rsicie of
;

~~^r.i<~.to 'y^fnvt.

segment nt.; ..:. . .• o\_t:Iii led a:1

-

The misleading nature of such
Lows:

Segmentation of Ownership.

CI levron says that it "1 leld

an interest in a portion" of the development- -n-l * l: it i t h^d ''no
interest

l

ir

^nv development

other

•!; T27-28

!9

City brief, . '->
7

t1,::"

•;.•-•

; the

•• [•-•n

station."

That oblique reference to ownership, outside of any

time-context, attempts to segment ownership of the project and to
distance the Chevron phase from the development as a whole.
In fact, Chevron did not own the parcel at the time the
conditional use permit was approved.

It was owned in common by

respondents Yeates, Priest, Kjar and Smoot -- the joint developers
of the entire tract.

Chevron did not acquire ownership of the

parcel until approximately five months after the conditional use
p|

permit was approved.

Motions for summary judgment had been heard

one month prior to conveyance to Chevron. Chevron impliedly admits
that it did not acquire control over the design and development of
pp

its station until that time.
Prior to legal action, the County's attorney conceded "if it
is one development, the boundary commission law concerning the
half-mile would be applicable, even though it might be in different
ownership."

But, even without

that

admission, there

is no

evidence to support Chevron's contention that its project was
separate due to separate ownership.

The property was in one

ownership and it should be considered as a whole to determine if
the $750,000 urban development restriction was violated.

Chevron Brief, pp. 6-7.
R343.

See also, envelope 4, #3.

Chevron Brief, p. 18.
Envelope 5 #6, p. 2.
8

2.

Segmentation of the Land under Development.

shows that t.he property subject of ihir
. •:^\;--- - * "-. '"'m<

'N '--r.^- ' •
$73C , • ' •
vurA

£:v::r

:
rrV|r

!w

!

The value of the ] and far exceeds

•" ,

; • , snrink

-

s

•

Chevron

ingle

th- 1 -v- ! '-r^^^.

pad, separate

"

service

..-- z

v,r^vron concedes tlia. t tl ie:i it: : osts

restriction, respondents now n'l .;it. :,,
.i,:;'

action i.? proposed a-- a

i p $-760,000,

^ ; < M.11|: , , „

^*-

• -ij •r 3

" :.-

•*

below
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f?-* •

-

$7^0 000
3

res1" or the
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the
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,

.

itse]-"

:

'

•

•

* ^nf'irely iicticnal.

J1 *

*

.

•

> *• o

refuted ; •/ ::hc evidence

before * :v> '~orr^ - r d implicitly by respondent > c w : bri-^f-*..
± n

c

j '

>

'

*

i •„ • ' _ • , - . ; • : .

i -i

.

.

*

• ^

- e

was platted separately frcr; the balance of t.he subdivision or -hat
the land was conveyed s^pc^pr-*]- rf--^r *-'•
contrary,, the owners o. - .

. ..

c,

r

;

'T'ar*; -iudgmerr .

,..,-.,, , ,,. x,,,,,_

the
,

;

t

*^'«

?r> 1 1 • i • -"'. ' • referenced appraisal : c included
administrative evidence and •-» suim-*'*. ! no 1 ud^-d a- Sxd-ic-*
this brief.
Mievron Brief, ^

:"-•!.

: l/

' Id.
9

:

:: the
'" to

they would be the sole developers of the project and that all
construction would proceed as a single development.
While asserting a fiction segmentation of the development,
respondents ignore undisputed evidence before the Court that, at
the time summary judgment was heard, the Chevron station was part
of a unified parcel, under one ownership, and under the control of
a single developer.
3.

Segmentation of the Chevron Project Itself.

Just as

there are phases of a subdivision development, there are phases of
an

individual

commonly

project.

used

"construction."
includes

to

The

term

include

"phases

both

"land

of development"
acquisition"

is
and

The statutory definition of "urban development"

"all" of these "phases."

clear, and not wholly beyond

Since the definition is

reason, it should be

applied

in

accordance with its literal wording.
Trying
restriction,

to

limbo

under

respondents

the

pretend

$750,000
that

"all

urban

development

phases"

of

development means construction of the building "shell" only.
a

segmentation

28

would

exclude

many

true

costs

of

a

their
Such

finished

R245.
See City Brief, pp. 4-6.

30
Such usage employed in Summary of Utah Real Property Law,
Reuben Clark Law School, Vol". II," 1987", p. 511.
Section 10-1-104(11), Utah Code Ann. (1953)
31
32
Gord v. Salt Lake City, 20 Utah 2d 138, 434 P.2d 449,451
(1967).
10

developmerr .
design;

.^jse

*:

i

. . . . : . ,
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-
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o' f h — - r — . <- ^'^^.-,
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a
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^
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Development
'nopr^v^"
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'
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'' '
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required.
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because

;;

'T -ban

'"

Process.

uiip/i d e v e l o p m e n t as defirod by statute.

p e r m i t s w e r e also

;:5::S

the D e v e l o p m e n t

statute rrab^r- i+~ unlawful

-.•''*.

property

of

'pr:iv t;"

Respondents
ODei : s on this

conditi.or.a_

use

Zoning and use approvals on this development were not a series
of unrelated events. They are stages of a process -- an "approval"
process

.

The development process commonly includes acquiring

zoning as a condition to land acquisition.
Respondent

Yeates

was

the

property

zoning, and developer of the property.

owner,

applicant

for

He requested and received

commercial zoning by the County in the month preceding application
for the Chevron conditional use permit.

He applied for a use

permit for the McDonalds phase approximately one month later.

He

appeared at all zoning and conditional use hearings as a principle
advocate of all phases of the development.
The property owners' entire development was
presented
requested.

to

the

County

at

the

time

commercial

laid out and
zoning

was

Plainly, zoning of the property was a critical and

proximate element of the county approval process.

Without the

first step, no development could have proceeded.
Respondents

attempt to

segment

zoning

approvals

from

the

balance of the development approval process is transparent tactic

Both Chevron and the County refer to the processing of
zoning applications as approvals.
Chevron brief, p. 5; County
brief, p. 8.
This case is typical in that subdividers must often secure
rezoning to make a project feasible. Purchase agreements between
the developer and land seller are commonly subject to this
condition.
Summary of Utah Real Property Law, Brigham Young
University Legal Studies, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Vol. II, p.
513.
37

Envelope 6 #21.

Also Exhibit "B" to this brief.
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'he
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Still, respondents pretend that the City must declare more
annexation willingness. They argue that the annexation process has
nothing to do with this action and that the City must show its
willingness to annex through some other means.
Respondents' argument rests on two fatal flaws.
urban

development

statute

(10-2-418)

does

"declaration" of willingness by the City.

not

First, the
require

any

It speaks instead to

property owners -- if they want to develop, they must show that
they have attempted to annex.
Second,

urban

development

statute

is

integral

annexation laws of our state -- not independent from it.

to

the
It is

part of the state annexation act and its purpose is to encourage
annexation of "all of the urbanized unincorporated areas contiguous
to municipalities."

4

Arguments which fictionalize statutory obligations and which
artificially

segment

annexation

policies

and

processes,

are

misleading and should be rejected.
POINT II
CHEVRON AND THE COUNTY ATTEMPT TO CIRCUMVENT THE RULES
OF EVIDENCE AND CIVIL PROCEDURE WHICH APPLY TO SUMMARY
JUDGMENTS. THEIR MEANS IS TO POSIT AN OVERLY-RESTRICTIVE
STANDARD OF REVIEW. HOWEVER, BECAUSE THE COUNTY EXCEEDED
ITS LAWFUL JURISDICTION IN THIS CASE, THE "ARBITRARY OR
CAPRICIOUS" STANDARD POSED BY RESPONDENTS CANNOT BE USED
TO RESTRICT APPELLATE REVIEW
A.
BECAUSE SALT LAKE COUNTY HAD NO AUTHORITY TO APPROVE
DEVELOPMENT, ITS ACTIONS WERE UNLAWFUL AND THE "ARBITRARY OR
CAPRICIOUS" STANDARD DOES NOT APPLY.

€%i

* Section 10-2-401(5), Utah Code Ann. 1953
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summary j u d g m e n t v/as j u s t i f i e d ,

i r-*.n ^•"•r.t

j\e,s
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;easo:ir.oieness,

-

policy,

•

ear.:vM: •;<* o i ; e s t i ^ m ~ - i u r l e s s

<: n

adminisirai.ve
Coi i r t

;;

M V

the

scope

- :o

^tah
of

• :*' i-

A I M ~he rrourr.K- -•;: i I :v' interfere w i t h t h e l e g i s l a t i v e
choice of the means selected unless it is arbitrary, or
is directly prohibited by, or is inconsistent with the
policy of, the state or federal laws or the constitution
r\-f +-]T-I c Qf-qf» r^-r of th^ United States
:\-^ C- n t liar :: ^:<i c i ^ i r

tlMt: f~i i:he a r b i t r a r y / c a p r i c i o u s

t musi oe established f -.nt t h e Coi m t y ' s acti on is
consistent

;J :L statp statute and p.c .:<...

In Peatross v. Board of

1

" * C o u n t y b r i e f, p . 1 3 .

'

11,1 i i 1.1 i i i

(] 98 :::: ).

At. p. 1126, Emphasis added. To conflict with existing
state law means "permitting that expressly prohibited by statute,
or forbidding that expressly permitted by statute." Redwood Gym
v. Salt Lake County Commission, 624 P.2d 1138, 1144 (Utah 1981).
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County Commissioners,

the principle case relied on by the County,

the Court confirmed that the arbitrary/capricious standard only
applies if the County was acting lawfully:
"The standard rule is that appellate jurisdiction is the
authority to review the actions or judgments of an
inferior tribunal upon the record made in that tribunal
and to affirm, modify or reverse such action or judgment.
Correlated to this is the principle that ordinarily where
the lower tribunal, acting within the scope of its
authority, conducted a hearing and arrived at a decision,
the reviewing court will examine only the certified
records; and will not interfere with the matters of
discretion or upset the actions of the lower tribunal
except upon a showing that the tribunal acted in excess
of its authority or in a manner so clearly outside of
reason the ^action must be deemed arbitrary and
capricious.
Thus, the arbitrary/capricious test applies only where the
"reasonableness" of a discretionary action is the sole question.
It has no application where the County lacks authority to act.
The County and its planning commission are agencies of limited
jurisdiction.

Their "authority" is dependent entirely upon the

terms of the statutes reposing power in them.
jurisdiction on themselves.

They cannot confer

If the mandatory provisions of their

enabling statutes are not met, they have no authority to proceed.
The Urban Development Statute (10-2-418) limits the County's
jurisdiction territorially as well as in subject matter.

That

statute forbids the County to "approve or permit" urban development

* 8 555 P.2d 281 (Utah 1976). Naylor v. Salt Lake City
Corporation, 398 P.2d 27 (Utah 1965), the case relied on by
Chevron, does not support application of the "arbitrary or
capricious" standard in this case, because in Naylor,the statutory
authority of the City was not in question. At p. 28.
r 9

*

At p. 284 [Emphasis added].
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That appraisal is not contradicted in the evidence.

Accordingly,

there exists a "genuine issue of material fact" sufficient to
preclude summary judgment on these critical jurisdictional issues.
POINT III
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE COUNTY ACTED WITHIN ITS LAWFUL
AUTHORITY IN APPROVING THIS DEVELOPMENT, SUCH APPROVALS
ARE INVALID EVEN UNDER THE "ARBITRARY OR CAPRICIOUS"
REVIEW STANDARD POSED BY RESPONDENTS
The City's pleadings allege that even if the County had not
exceeded its jurisdiction, it nevertheless abused its discretion.
This is because the County's decisions to grant development permits
were not based on competent evidence.
Of course, technical rules of evidence need not be applied in
proceedings

in

administrative

proceedings.

administrative agencies are not wholly unrestricted.

However,
Although they

may consider some informal testimony, a residuum of competent legal
evidence must support their findings.
The County's brief has outlined the supposed "evidence" upon
which the County based its decisions.

That evidence shows a

ox

Yacht Club v. Utah Liquor Control Com'n, 681 P. 2d 1224,
1226 (Ut. 1984)
CO

Utah Courts have held that the "residuum rule" applies to
a broad range of agency proceedings.
Hackford v. Industrial
Commission, 11 Utah 2d 312, 358 P. 2d 899, 901~~(1961); Lack Shore
Motor Coach Lines Inc. v. Welling (Public Service Commission), 9
Utah 2d 114, 339 P.2d 1011, 1014 (1959); Sandy State Bank v.
Brimhall (Commissioner of Financial Institutions), 636 P.2d 481,
486 (1981); Kehl v. Schwendiman (Office of Drivers License
Services), 735~P.2d 413, 415 (Utah App. 1987); Yacht Club, supra,
(Liquor Control Commission).
County brief, p. 6.
18

complete lack of any "residuum of competent legal evidence" in the
following particulars:
1.

Nature

and

Scope

of

the

Development.

The

County

apparently concluded that the Chevron phase was distinct from the
balance of the development.

Yet, the application for change of

zoning of the 4.18 acre tract described the tract as a single
development -- a "commercial subdivision."

Businesses occupying

that subdivision are referred to as "tenants."

Although each

tenant has control of its own operation, the developer maintains
control of the entire development

and of its

"homogeneity

of

theme." 5 *
Chevron agents made unsworn
Planning Commission.

statements before

the County

None of these statements contradicted the

description of the development contained in the zoning application.
The Developer, Delyn Yeates, did suddenly allege that the property
was going to be developed by two developers.

However, he offered

no elaboration or explanation of what he meant.

Further, his

statement was later contradicted by citizens testifying before the
County Commission that Developer Yeates "promised that he would be
the developer of the whole project and not piece meal like has
happened before." 56

54 R100
55 Rill.
56 R245 (Testimony of Pam Delehanty).
19

2.

Costs

of

the

Development.

The

County

Director

of

Development Services, testifying before the Planning Commission,
confirmed that "when the entire site is developed it will exceed
the $750,000 figure." 57 Chevron officials, testifying at that same
hearing, confirmed that their costs for just the first two pads was
$760,000. 58
entire

A later MAI appraisal showed that the costs of the

development

indeed

far

exceeded

the

$750,000

urban

59

development restriction.
3.

Compliance with the Master Plan.

The application for

rezoning of the 4.18 acre development confirmed that "current land
use plan shows rural residential for this property."

County

staff and City officials both told the Planning Commission that
commercial use of this property was inconsistent with the Master
Plan. G1

No evidence was introduced before the Planning Commission

to show commercial uses to be consistent with the intent of the
master plan as required by County ordinances

or that the master

plan had somehow expired as now contended by respondents.
4.

City Willingness to Annex.

City officials confirmed to

the County Planning Commission that the proposed development was

57

Rill

58

R108.

59

R133-135

60

R100

G1

R23, 114, 165.

62

R22.
20

within the City's Annexation Policy Declaration Area
"Sandy City is willing to annex this territory."

and that

No evidence was

introduced before the Commission to contradict this testimony.
Therefore, there was no basis upon which to conclude that the City
was unwilling to annex.
5.

Public

Safety

and

Interests.

Some

residents

have

GG

GS

described the development as desireable,
some as not.
No one
with credentialed competence testified of traffic or other public
G7

safety impacts or of the economic needs of the area.
The

record

places

the

development

squarely

within

the

restrictions of the urban development statute and in contradiction
to the County's master plan.

Plainly, the Planning Commission did

not consider the full

scope and costs of the development, as

required by state law.

Acting outside of one's legal authority is

the epitome of arbitrary and capricious action.
The County also failed to comply with their own ordinances
which require "evidence" that the development complies with the
intent of the Master Plan and that the public interests will be
served.

63
6

The evidence demonstrates noncompliance with the Master

R023.

* R109.

65

R109, 110, 115.

GG

R108-109, 163.

£7
The attorney for Chevron did allege that there was a need
for a service station but claimed no expertise and presented no
facts in support of that contention. R113.
21

Plan.

Respondents attempted to construe the ordinances as merely

guidelines and presented no evidence of Master Plan compliance.
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that the failure of an agency
of

government

to

conform

its

official

regulations is arbitrary and capricious.

actions

to

its

own

The Court has said:

"Defendants contend that the procedural rules are merely
'guidelines,' but administrative regulations are presumed to
be reasonable and valid and cannot be ignored by the agency
to suit its own purposes. Such is the essence of arbitrary
and capricious action.
Without compelling grounds for not
following its rules, an agency must be held to them."
The County's failure to require evidence of compliance with
state statutes and county ordinances, in the face of clear evidence
of noncompliance, was the essence of capriciousness and is the
direct cause of this otherwise unnecessary legal action.
POINT IV
MUCH OF THE CHEVRON AND COUNTY BRIEFS CONSIST OF ARGUMENT
OF WHAT THE LAW SHOULD BE RATHER THAN WHAT IT IS.
ACCEPTANCE OF THE POLICIES UNDERLYING THOSE ARGUMENTS
WOULD DO CRITICAL DAMAGE TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR STATE.
A.
TO PERMIT THE COUNTY TO IGNORE ITS MASTER PLAN WITHOUT
ADOPTION OF A NEW PLAN OR EVEN RUDIMENTARY INQUIRY INTO THE IMPACTS
OF DEVELOPMENT ON NEIGHBORING COMMUNITIES RISKS SERIOUS DAMAGE TO
OUR STATE.
Uses of land, such as those of Chevron, which do not conform
to the comprehensive zoning plan of the community, have been a
source

of

deep

concern

to

legislators

and

planners.

These

nonconforming uses limit the effectiveness of land-use controls and

00

R100, 165

[Emphasis added].
State, Etc. v.
Council, 614 P.2d 1259, 1263 (Ut. 1980)
22

Utah

Merit

System

share responsibility for the blight which has infected many urban
areas. 70

Municipal attorneys,

urban planners,

and law review

commentators73 agree that nonconforming uses imperil the success
of the community plan and injure property values.
These generally-recognized

policies are precisely why the

legislative body of the County has prohibited by ordinance, uses
which do not conform to the comprehensive plan of the County.
legislative

act

is equally

binding

nonconforming uses in the County.

on Chevron

and

all

That
other

The ordinance is not subject to

"variance" or alteration by the Planning Commission or the courts
of this state.
B.
MUNICIPAL ANNEXATION IS THE PRINCIPLE MEANS OF DEVELOPMENT IN
OUR STATE. TO PERMIT LARGE SCALE UNINCORPORATED DEVELOPMENT ALONG
CITY BORDERS DIRECTLY CONTRADICTS STATE LEGISLATIVE POLICY AND
RETARDS GENERAL GROWTH BY RESTRICTING THE EXTENSION OF MUNICIPAL
SERVICES.

Anderson, American Law of Zoning, Second Edition, Volume
1, p. 357.
71

Messer, Non-conforming Uses, Municipalities and the Law in
Action, p. 347 (1951).
72
Lewis, A New Zoning Plan for the District of Columbia, p.
112 (1956).
73

Comment, 7 Baylor Law Review, p. 73 (1955); Comment, 102
University of Pennsylvania Law Review, p. 91 (1953); Comment, 1
Buffalo Law Review, p. 286 (1952); Comment, 9 University of Chicago
Law Review, p. 477 (1942); Mendelker, Prolonging the Nonconforming
Use; Judicial Restriction on the Power to Zone in Iowa, 8 Drake Law
Review, p. 23 (1958); Norton, Elimination of Nonconforming Uses and
Structures, 20 Law & Contemporary Problems, p. 305 (1955);
O'Reilly, The Nonconforming Use and Due Process of Law, 23
Georgetown Law Journal, p. 218 (1935); Young, Regulation and
Removal of Nonconforming Uses, 12 Western Reserve Law Review, p.
681 (1961); Summary of Utah Law: Land Use, Zoning and Eminent
Domain, BYU Journal of Legal Studies
(1979), p. 151.
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Growth of development is critical to the economic welfare of
our state.

The state legislature has long recognized that the

means by which development occurs is through the expansion of City
boundaries.

Through this means, vital services are brought to

areas of growth potential or undergoing development impact.
Because City services follow municipal annexation, actions
which block the growth of City boundaries also retard municipal
service delivery.

Generally, where such services are stopped,

orderly growth cannot occur.
Salt Lake County has long sponsored commercial development in
unincorporated

areas,

unincorporated

islands.

benefits,

cities have

along

the

borders

of

cities

and

in

Although the County has received tax
suffered

as commercial

developers

avail

themselves of lower County development standards and still utilize
municipal services along City borders.
Because a city cannot annex so as to leave an island of
unincorporated area, these commercial developments, which resist
annexation, restrict annexation along the entire length of a city
boundary.
In order to avoid damage to development from such practices,
the state legislature has prohibited the County from approving
urban development within one-half mile of a city boundary.

The

City respectfully submits that if that explicit restriction is not
honored, in its express terms, city growth throughout our state
will be severely retarded, as Counties are then encouraged to

24

compete with Cities for tax base.

When City growth is halted, so

also is full municipal service delivery to many developing areas.
CONCLUSION
Chevron and County have attempted to avoid state statutes,
county ordinances, and the rules of procedure and evidence.

Those

efforts lack legal foundation. Further, genuine issues of material
fact are glaring.

Important

legal

rulings

require

adequate

factual development. Discovery is the appropriate means to resolve
issues of fact.
judgment

For reasons both practical and legal, summary

should be vacated

in order

that basic discovery may

proceed.
DATED this Ofl '

day of November, 1988.
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APPENDIX "A"
Statement of Facts
(Including Supplemental References)
The facts as appear unrefuted of record in this action are as
follows:
The Parties and their Interests
1.

Sandy City is a Utah municipality created to provide

urban governmental services essential for sound urban development
and for the protection of public health, safety and welfare in
residential,

commercial

undergoing development.
2.

and

industrial

areas,

and

in

areas

R2 and Utah Code Ann. 10-2-401(2) (1979)

Defendants Yeates, Priest, Kjar, Smoot, Postero-Blecker

("Property Owners"), are property owners and developers of a parcel
of unincorporated territory ( the "Property") which lies within
one-half mile of Sandy City limits and within territory the City
has proposed for municipal expansion in its policy declaration.
R3, 10-11
3.

Defendant Salt Lake County ("County") is a subdivision

of the state of Utah, organized and functioning under authority of
Title

17 of the Utah Code, and located

in Salt Lake County.

Defendant County Planning Commission is a commission appointed by
the County and operating under authority of Chapter 27, Title 17,
of the Utah Code. R3
4.

Defendants Chevron and Postero-Blecker are Pennsylvania

and Arizona corporations, respectively, doing business in the state
of Utah.

R3
1

The Property and Its Authorized Uses
5.

This action involves a single parcel of approximately

4.18 acres of commercial property

("Property") located on the

northwest corner of 10600 South and 1300 East, in unincorporated
Salt Lake County ("County").

R4

The Property immediately abuts

the municipal boundaries of Sandy City ("City"), and is located
within an unincorporated "island" within the limits of the City.
6.

Since its adoption in 1976, the County Master Plan for

the area has called for Rural Residential uses on the Property.
R100, 165

Sandy City plans also specify similar such uses.

The

Property has historically been zoned Residential (R-1-8) consistent
with both City and County plans.
7.

R100, 102

On August 5, 1987, at the request of the property owner,

the County amended its zoning to permit commercial development
(Commercial C-2 and Residential RM/zc) on the Property.

R18-19,

102-103

The County master plan was not amended to account for this

change.

For this and other reasons, the City objected to the

rezoning.
8.

R17
The City has adopted an Annexation Policy Declaration

under authority of state statute.

Rll, 30-34

The purpose of this

Policy is to declare the areas which the City is willing to annex.
The Property is within the area projected for expansion under that
Policy Declaration.

R34, T30 The effect of the Policy Declaration

is to prohibit County approval of commercial development in excess
of $750,000 on the Property, unless the Property Owners have first
2

attempted to annex.

Utah Code Ann. 10-2-418 (1979)

Owners have not attempted to annex.

The Property

Rll

The Owners' Development Activities
9.

In 1987, the Property Owners purchased the Property with

express intention to develop a "commercial subdivision." R162

The

evidence is undisputed that the land value alone exceeds $850,000.
R108, 111, 133-135
10.

The

Owners'

development

"commercial subdivision."

R162, 164

is

in

fact

a

multiphased

It's first phase is a Chevron

Service Complex and the second phase a McDonalds Restaurant.

There

are also other phases of development on the property, the specifics
of which have not been disclosed by the Property Owners.

However,

costs of development in all phases will run to millions dollars.
R133-135
11.

There was substantial neighborhood resistance to their

development.

R108,

163, 165

The

Owners made

concessions

residential neighbors in order to minimize opposition.

to

R110, 246

One concession was that the Owners would be the sole developers of
the project and that all construction would proceed as a single
development.

R245

The owners were successful at overcoming some

County and community resistance through this and other means. R115
12.

On August 26, 1987, Defendant Postero-Blecker, on behalf

of Chevron, applied to Salt Lake County for a Conditional Use
Permit for construction on approximately .7 acres of the Property.
R20

Such a permit is required by Salt Lake County ordinances for

commercial development within this zone.
3

R21-22A

Such ordinances

require that permit applications be made by the "owners" of the
Property.

R21

Neither Postero-Blecker nor Chevron was the owner

of the property at the time of application or consideration by the
District Court.
13.

R245, 285, 343, T75-76

The proposed project was a service station, convenience

store and car wash.

R107, 181

The Postero-Blecker application

placed the value of the development at $250,000.

R20

However,

uncontroverted evidence before the District Court showed the actual
value of the .7 acre of land alone, to be $200,000 to $210,000.
The costs of improvements are an additional $450,000 to $550,000.
That total cost range of $650,000 to $760,000, did not include land
values or improvement costs for the McDonalds Restaurant or any
other projects on the remaining 3.48 acres of the Property.

R108,

111, 133-135, 246-247
14.

On about September 30, 1987

(approximately one month

after the Chevron application), the Property Owners, through their
agent, filed a second application for a conditional use.

R168

This application was for a "McDonald's Restaurant" to be located
on the Property adjacent to and immediately to the north of the
Chevron Center.

R168

McDonalds was not owner of the property at

the time of their applications or at any time prior to initiation
of this action.
15.

The

R114, 133-135, 247, 285, 308, 343, T75-76
application

for

this

second

(McDonalds)

phase

specified the value of the project, including land, to be $300,000.
$168

However, the evidence before the County showed the stand

4

alone costs of the second phase to be $900,000 to $1,100,000.
R133-135
County Approval of Phases One and Two
16.

On October

13, 1987, the County

Planning

Commission

approved the conditional use application for the first (Chevron)
phase, over objection by the City.
Sandy

City

Commission.
17.
City's

appealed

that

decision

R115
to

On October 14, 1987,
the

Salt

Lake

County

R27

On October 21, 1988, the County Commission denied the

request

for

appeal

and upheld

the Planning

Commission

decision. The County Commission also entered findings of fact over
written objection by the City.
18.

On October 27, 1987, the County Planning

approved the use application for the second
R167

Commission

(McDonalds) phase.

The City appealed that approval to the County Commission on

November 4, 1987.

On December 9, 1987, the County Commission

denied

appeal

the

application.

City's

and

approved

the

conditional

use

R249
Disposition in the District Court

19.

On

November

6,

1987,

Sandy

City

filed

a

verified

complaint in Third District Court to require compliance with the
foregoing requirements. R2

By letter dated November 19, 1987, the

City Attorney inquired of counsel for the Owners, of a convenient
date for deposition of Owner Yeates.
respond to that inquiry.

R202

Defendant's counsel did not

However, Answers to the complaint

5

were filed by the defendants in December 1987 and January 1988.
R49, 56, 63
20.

Motions for summary judgment were filed by all defendants

in January, 1988.

R75, 125, 155

On January 26, 1988, the City

responded with its own motion for summary judgment.
by

the

City

and

Chevron

were

accompanied

memoranda. R133, 136-150, 159-168, 78-117

by

R151

Motions

affidavits

and

The City filed a Motion

to Strike certain portions of defendant's affidavits and other
documents and filed an affidavit of counsel evidencing the need for
additional discovery time.
21.
summary

R173-178, 198-206

On February 5, 1988, the Court heard the motions for
judgment

and Motion

to

Strike.

R118, 122, 127, 169

Counter affidavits were filed by the City on the day prior to the
hearing.

R185-188

In addition, during the hearing, Defendant Salt

Lake County submitted numerous documents to the court, without
prior notice to the City.

The County evidence was received by the

Court over oral objection by the City and without inquiry as to
"good cause".
22.

T21-30, 74-75

On February 25, 1988, Salt Lake County filed a Motion

for Certification of the Record which it had filed with the Court
at the hearing on summary judgment, together with
related documents, which motion was granted.
23.

supplemental

R255-258

On March 15, 1988, the Court filed a Memorandum Decision

denying the City's Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike
and granting defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment and Salt Lake
County's Motion for Certification.
6

R259-263

On April 8, 1988, the

Court entered its formal Order and Judgment of Dismissal, which
order forms the basis of this appeal.
24.

R265

On April 28, 1988, the City filed a Motion for Injunction

During Pendency of Appeal.

R334

The motion was based in part on

affidavits showing that comprehensive development was occurring on
the entire Property and that the Property Owners had conveyed the
property to Chevron and McDonalds after the motions for summary
judgment had been heard.

R324, 327

affidavits ordered stricken.

R339

7

That motion was denied and the
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EXHIBIT "C"
SUMMARY OF IMPORTANT FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS
SUBJECT:

4.64 acre raw ground, proposed
convenience store and fast food
restaurant.

LOCATION:

NWC of 10600 South 1300 East, Salt
Lake County, Utah.

HIGHEST AND BEST USE:
As VacantAs Proposed -

Convenience store/gasoline
sales/car wash and fast food
restaurant facilities.
Same as vacant use.

SIZE:

4.64 acre Total raw land area
Chevron - 30,260 square feet with
170 feet frontage along 10600 South
and 178 feet of frontage along 13 00
East Street.
McDonald's - 54,885 square feet
with 295 feet of frontage along
1300 East Street.

PROPOSED IMPROVEMENTS;

850 to 900 square foot range for
the Chevron convenience store and
3,367 square feet for the
McDonald's restaurant.

ZONING:

C-2 and RM/zc

OWNER OF RECORD:

Steven E. Smoot; K. Delyn Yates; R.
Scott Priest; W. Scott Kjar (4.39
acres)
Dry Creek Reservoir & Irrigation
Company (.25 acres)

APPRAISED INTEREST:

Fee Simple Title

DATE OF APPRAISAL:

December 2, 1987

VALUATION CONCLUSIONS
Raw Land Value 4.64 acres
Raw Land Value 3 0,2 60 s.f.
(proposed Chevron site)
Raw Land Value 54,885 s.f
(proposed McDonald's site)
Cost of Chevron Improvements
(includes land value)

$900,000
$210,000
$275,000
$660,000 to $760,000 (range)

Cost of McDonald's Improvemnts $900,000 to $1,100,000 (range)
(includes land value; does not include franchise fees)
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